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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
BRUCE 0. NEWTON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

THE ST ATE OF UT AH and THE UTAH
STATE ROAD COMMISSION,

C:oi.se No.
11465

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant's motor vehicle collided with a snow
removal truck owned by the State of Utah, as the
driver-employee of the State Highway Department
was negotiating a left turn at the intersection of 9th
South and State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, on December 30, 1966 at 1: 15 a.m.
DISPOSITION OF CASE
The Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, presiding, entered judgment in favor of the defendant
and against the plaintiff no cause of action.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondent requests the court to affirm the
judgment of the District Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 30th day of December, 1966, at approximately 1: 15 a.m., at the intersection of 9th South
Street and State Street, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake
County, Utah, a driver of Respondent's vehicle was
negotiating a left turn from the position between
the left turn holding lane and the through lane of
east bound traffic on 9th south into the center lane
of north bound traffic on State Street to complete
the "salt" spreading necessary to eliminate the snow
hazard on the highway. Yellow warning lights were
flashing and a roto beam amber light mounting on
the cab of the 1965 International Truck owned by
Respondent, was in operation. Respondent's driver
was proceeding to turn left on the appropriate green
light, having a1lowed immediate traffic to pass. Appellant was driving a 1959 Ford Ranchero proceeding westerly and collided with the Respondent's
vehicle damaging the front end of appellant's vehicle and the right side of respondent's truck.
The collision occurred approximately fifteen to
twenty feet east of the northeast comer of the intersection.
Appellant testified that he first saw the Respondent's truck when he was approximately 225 feet
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east of the intersection (R-223) and the next time he
saw the State Road Vehicle impact was inevitable,
Appellant d8scribing the truck as "50 feet high and
300 feet long" (R-2 l 6).
POINT I
THE SUPREME COURT IN REVIEWING THE
JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE MUST VIEW THE EVIDENCE
IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE RESPONDENT AND SHOULD AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
COURT BELOW.

Appellant has misapplied the holdings of this
Court concerning appeals of non-suit judgments to
the procedural determination announced by the
Court below of "no cause of action."
While it is true that non-suit judgments may be
based upon "nc cause of action" the procedure
whereby the defendant may move for a non-suit
judgment following the presentation of the plaintiff's
case is different from the facts of the instant case.
After the presentation of both the plaintiff's and defendant's evidence and testimony, the Court reached
a conclusion of negligence on the part of the appellant. There being no cross-claim against the appellant by the respondent, the Court held there be
"no cause of action."
The appeal record does not contain a motion
for "non-suit." "Non-suit" and "no cause of action"
are not symnonymous terms. The appellant's argument mus~ be disregarded and the better reasoning
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of the Court in cases such as the instant appeal
should be followed.
"It is elementary that where there is dispute
in the evidence, resolving the conflicts is for
the jury under its prerogative as to the exclusive
finder of facts. It is equally so that because of the
jury's verdict in his favor, we accept the respondent's version of the facts and review the
evidence and all inferences fairly to be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to him .... "
Smith v. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2nd 344, 400 P 2nd
570, 572 ( 1965).

It must be acknowledged that when a trial by
jury is waived the trial judge is the exclusive finder
of fact. The aforementioned holding of Simth v. Gallegos is applicable to the present appeal. This Court
should, therefore, review the determination of the
trial judge in a light most favorable to the respondent.
Affirming a decision of the trial judge sitting
without a jury in an action arising out of an intersection collision, this court stated that:
"Since reasonable minds could differ in resolving the questions of contributory negligence
and proximate cause, we cannot disturb the trial
judges determination of them." Country Club
Foods v. Barney, 10 Utah 2nd 317, 319, 352 P
2nd776 (1960).

Judgment in the lower Court was entered following a complete hearing of the arguments by
opposing counsel. The determination of the trial
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judge was properly determined based upon the opportunity to evaluate the evidence and testimony
and is not a judgment of "non-suit."
Therefore, the Supreme Court should review
the action in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and affirm the judgment of the lower
Court against the plaintiff.
POINT II
THERE WAS NO ERROR OF THE LOWER COURT
IN ENTERING JUDGMENT WHICH STATED TWO
NEGLIGENT ACTS OF THE APPELLANT WHEN THE
ORAL PRONOUNCEMENT STATED ONLY ONE ACT
OF NEGLIGENCE.

Statutory procedure set forth in rule 52, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
specifies that:
In all actions tried upon facts without a jury ....
this Court shall find the facts specially and state
separately its conclusions of law thereon and
judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58 A.

This Court has held that an appeal will not be
entertained from the decision announced by the trial
judge from the bench as only final judgment entered in accordance with law are appealable. Watson
v. O'Dell, 176 P 619, 53 Ut. 96 (1918); Ellinwood v. Bennion, 73 Ut. 563, 276 P 159 (1929).
An order for a judgment is itself not a
judgment and an appeal does not lie from it as a
final judgment,
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Long standing precedence of this Court has
established that a trial may enter judgment which
differs from the decision announced at the close of
the trial proceedings. Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Ut. 27 4,
415 P 2nd 662, 663 (J 966).
That the written judgment supercedes the oral
statement of the court is not questioned. McCollum v. Clothifr, 121 Ut. 3 11, 241P2nd 468
(1952); Walker Bank v. Walker Case No. 10374,
17 Ut. 2nd 390, 412 P 2nd 920, 1966; that the
written judgment also supercedes the minute
entry see Harffwd Accident tJ Tnd('/nnity Company v. Clegg, 103 Utah 414, 135 P 2nd 919.

Announcing this criteria the Court inMcCollum
Clotherier, supra, at 472 held:

1.

The only judgment that can be given effect is
the one entered in accordance with bw. " .... no
antecedent expression of the judge can in any
way restrict his ab5olute power to declare his final
conclusion in the only manner authorized by
law, to wit: by filing his 'decision' (Findings of
Fact and Conclmions of Law . . . . ") Phillip v.
Hooper, 43 Cal App 1nd 467, 111 P 2nd 22,
23. "Oral statements of opinion by the trial court
inconsistent with the findings ultimately rendered
do not effect the final judgment. (citation omitted)"

We therefore, submit there is no error in the
record.
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POINT III
THE COURT BELOW WAS CORRECT IN FINDING
THE APPELLANT NEGLGENT IN FAILING TO KEEP
AN APPROPRIATE LOOKOUT.

Appellant's testimony clearly shows that the
Court, as a trier of fact, could reasonably conclude
that the appellant failed to keep an appropriate
lookout. Excerpts taken from the testimony of the
appellant from the trial transcript, (R 219) indicates
the following question?
Q. (by Mr. Frank) How many times do you
recall seeing the truck?"
"A. I noticed the truck as it was coming
down, the next thing I knew it was when it
was in front of me and I hit it."

The amended left turn statute, § 41-6-73, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, has placed a duty upon the
driver when negotiating a left turn to determine if
there are any vehicles approaching from the opposite direction which would constitute a hazard.
The Court in Smith 1 Gallegos, supra, at 572, also
also placed the duty of care upon the driver proceeding thru the intersection.
1

•

"Notwithstanding the onerous duty now imposed upon the left turner by the new statute
he is entitled to assume that other drivers will
also be conforming to the requirements of law by
keeping within the speed limit, by keeping a
proper lookout and by keeping proper control
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over their cars and by using reasonable care for
the safety of themselves and others."

Additional caution is imposed upon the driver
of a vehicle approaching an intersection displaying
warning lamps by the motor vehicle code, § 41-6-133
(d) Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Any vehicle may be equipped with lamps
which may be used for the purpose of warning
the operators of other vehicles of the presence
of vehicular traffic hazard requiring the exercise of unusual care in approaching, or overtaking or passing and when so equipped may display
such warning in addition to any other warning
signals required by this act.

There was sufficient testimony presented to the
Court to show that the appellant's vehicle was displaying warning signals required by § 41-6-140.20
Utah Code Annotated 1953.
Snow removal equipment and other work vehiclesThe State Road Commission sh a 11 adopt
standards and specifications applicable to . . . .
other lamps on snow removal machinery when
operated on the highway, . . . . such standards
and specifications must require the use of flashing lights visible from all directions and for
identification distinct as to color.

Standards for light on snow and ice control
equipment effective on the morning of December
30, 1966, were approved March 16, 1960 by the State
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Road Commlssion. The Commission adopted the
policy of the American Association of State Highway
Officials on "Standard Identification Lights for Snow
and Ice Control Equipment". The pertinent specifications are:
( c) The lights shall be flashing or be of
the revolving type ....
( d)

Amber in color

Duty of care of a driver approaching an authorized snow removal vehicle displaying the approved
warning light authorized by the Department of
Highways, is set forth in § 41-6-140 Utah Code Annotated 1953 prior to the amendment of 1967, and is
therefore the criteria for establishing the negligence
of the appellant on December 30, 1966. The pertinent
language is as follows:
( c) flashing lights are prohibited except
on . . . . an authorized . . . . snow removal or
other authorized work vehicle or machinery, ....
as a means of indicating . . . . the presence of a
vehicle traffic haz.1rd requiring unusual care in
approaching, overtaking or passing.

The emphasized language of this section was
identical with § 41-6-133 Utah Code Annotated 1953
and was eliminated in 1967 Laws of Utah 1967 Chapter 92. The amended section § 41-6-140 was utilized
to specify the restrictions of lighting devices rather
than setting forth the duty of care of the approaching
driver as § 41-6-133 provisions apply to all vehicles
authorized to display warning lamps.
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Appellant testified that he observed the respondents truck when he was approximately 225
feet east of the intersection, trial transcript (R-223).
The Court also presented questions to the appellant in order to clarify the question of the application of brakes (R. 216).
The Court: . . . . How far were you from
the truck by your best estimate when you applied
the brakes?
Witness: Distance wise it is awful difficult to say. I was coming up to the intersection
slow and the light turned green and I started to
proceed on thru, the next thing I know the truck
is right in front of me. It is fifty feet high and
three hundred feet long and distance wise I
couldn't tell. ...

Appellant did not proceed with "unusual care,"
after first observing the Respondent's vehicle. Trial
testimony of the appellant as to his own lookout was
sufficient to present the court with the basis of the
findings of "failure to maintain a proper lookout."
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT THE APPELLANT WAS TRAVELING AT AN
EXCESSIVE SPEED FOR EXISTING CONDITIONS.

Pertaining to the findings of excessive speed
the trial judge was correct in weighing all evidence
and testimony. Appellant has presented to this
Court the fact that the only testimony as to the speed
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of he appellant's vehicle was from the testimony
of the appellant who stated this his speed was "15,
16, 17 miles per hour" (R 188 and 193).
This Court has stated in Johnson v. Cornwall, 15
Utah 2nd 17'.2, 174, 389 P 2nd 710 (1954), that a statement as to the speed by the drivers of a truck involved in a left turn intersection accident were
"more estimates and the iury was not bound to believe them".
In cases tried without a jury, the trial judge is
given a responsibility of the finder of facts and may
weigh all evidence and testimony. In Kiepe v. LeCheminant, 17 Utah 2nd 141, 4th 18 Pac. 2nd 894, 896 (1966)
this Court stc.ted:
The duty to make findings rest primarily upon
the trial court which is in a better position to
determine the weight of the testimony than the
Supreme Court, Echer v. Hatch, 70 Ut. 1 257
Pac. 673.

Testimony as to the estimate of speed could be
weighed by the trier of facts together with statements
of the intent of the appellant as he approached the
intersection. (R. 188)
Question: As you approached the intersection of 9th South and State, what if anything,
did you observe?
Amwer: Well, I was keeping my eyes pretty
well open on what was going on in the road and
I was looking north and south as far as I could
see there to be sure that things were slowing
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down and coming to a halt so that I could proceed on thru without stopping the truck when
the light turned green.

Determination by the trial judge of the excessive
speed for existing conditions could properly be concluded from the evJdence presented concerning
weather conditions, point of impact, and failure to
use "unusual care" in proceeding past the vehicle
displaying an amber warning light.
The existing conditions in the intersection specifically stated in findings of fact as presented to
this Court in the appeal record (R. 61-62) constituted
an actual hazard demanding strict ad herence to the
provisions of § 41-6-46, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
( 1) No person shall drive a vehicle on a
highway at a speed greater than is reasonable
and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential haards then existing. In every event, speed shall be so controlled
as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any
pei:son, vehicle, or other conveyance . . . .
( 3) The driver of every vehicle shall, consistent with the requirements of sub-division ( 1)
of this section, drive at an appropriate reduced
speed when approaching or crossing an intersection . . . . and when special hazards exist with
respect .... other traffic or by reason of weather
or highway conditions.

Testimony offered by appellant under direct examination by his own counsel (R. 88) indicates that
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he was intending to avoid the necesstiy of stopping
at the intersection and maintained a steady speed
to the point where impact was inevitable.
Appellant's failure to control his speed "having
regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing" i.e. snow upon the highway and presence of
snow removal equipment in the intersection with
roto-beam warning light in operation, resulting in
a collision in violation of the above subsection (1)
requiring that "speed shall be so controlled as may
be necessary to avoid colliding with any .... vehicle" may be "regarded as prima fade evidence of
negligence", Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d
30, 395 P.2d 62, Klaf fa v. Smith, 17 Utah 2d 65 404 P.2d
659 (1965).
POINT V
THE COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
THE DRIVER OF RESPONDENTS VEHICLE EXERCISED
THE DEGREE OF CARE IN NEGOTIATING A LEFT
TURN AS IS IMPOSED BY LAW.

U.C.A., 1953, 41-6-73, Vehicle Turning Left at Intersection:
The driver of a vehicle within an intersection intending to turn to the left shall yield the
right of way to any vehicle approaching from the
opposite direction which is within the intersection or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard, during the time when such
driver is moving within the intersection.
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The Court has recently interpreted the language
of this provision in the case of Smith 11. Gallego1, supra,
at 572:
If the left turner in performing his duty, and
in making the required observation, sees no vehicle approaching, or that any coming is far
enough away so that he can reasonably believe
that he has time to make his turn, he may proceed.

Prior to the amendment of Section 41-6-73, this
Court considered what constituted "immediate hazard" in regards to left turn situations.
Richards v. Anderson, Utah 2d 17, 337 P.2d 59 (1959):
There is, of course, no precise set of measurements by which an immediate hazard can be
gauged. It must be judged on the basis of common sense in the light of existing circumstances.
In reference to a similar situation the Supreme
Court of Delaware has said that an "immediate
hazard" is created when a vehicle approaches
an intersection on a favored street at a reasonable
speed under such circumstances that, if the disfavored driver proceeds into the intersection it
will force the favored driver to sharply and suddenly check his progress or stop in order to avoid
collision. Conversely, if the disfavored driver has
made his stop and deferred to all vehicles that
would be required to go into a sharp or sudden
braking to avoid collision, the cars far enough
away have a clear margin to observe and make a
smooth and safe stop are not an "immediate
hazard" and are required to yield to the driver
already at the intersection.
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Appellants a_re mistaken in stating that "Mr. Kennedy was guilty of statutory negligence." Appellant's Brief, page 8.
This Court has upon several occasions ruled
that violation of a traffic, safety standard does not
constitute negligence per se. In Klaffa i·. Smith, supra
at 68, the Ccurt reaffirmed its previous decisions.
"(T) his court has in a number of cases, but
with slight variations in the language, reaffirmed
the view. which we think is the correct one, that
violation of a standard of safety set by statute
or ordinance is to be regarded as prima facie
evidence of negligence, but is subject to justification or excuse if the evidence is such that it
reasonably could be found that the conduct was
nevertheless within the standard of reasonable
care under the circumstances."
. We think the foregoing rule is the
logical and reasonable one and in fact the only
rule rhat can fairly be applied to the practical
exigencies of human conduct and conform to our
conception of law and justice."

Respondent's equipment operator was properly executing a left turn into the center lane of the
East half of State Street to proceed with the salt
spreading which was necessary in the snow removal assignment for the safety of the users of highways of the State of Utah.
Legislative enactment of requirements for the
use of "flashing lights visible from all directions for
identification, distinct as to color," to be used upon
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"snow removal machinery when operated on the
highways" specified that the use of such warning
lamps was necessary to warn other drivers of the
presence of such equipment.
The operation of which may in hours of
darkness necessitate par king in lanes of traffic,
travelling against traffic sudden stops and otherwise interfering with normal traffic flow.
41-6-140.20, U.C.A., 1953.

This statutory provisions indicates the legislative
intent to grant to operators of such maintenance vehicles certain exemptions from the ordinary "rules
of the road" if necessary to perform the duties.
Mr. Kennedy, driver of Respondent's snow removal machinery, was diligent in his duties to adequately spread the salt necessary to keep the snow
covered highways of the State of Utah in condition
for geenral usage by other vehicles.
In the performance of his duties he was required
to drive a motor vehicle equipped with a spreading
device which was designed to be used, not in one
single lane of traffic, but by straddling the lanes of
traffic in order to spread a radius of approximately
20 feet of roadway.
Appellant contends that the driver of Respondent's vehicles was negligent in negotiating a left
turn from a position other than completely within
the left turn holding lane. The court below properly
concluded that although the Respondent's driver
had straddled the left turn lane and the left through
lanes of traffic on Ninth South in moving into a posi-
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tion to enter State Street in a position approximately
straddling the left through lane and center lane of
traffic, that driver had exercised the duty of care imposed by Jaw.
Legislative intent in the creation of the Highway
Code is codified as 27-12-1, U.C.A., 1953 and specifies that:
"The legislature intends to declare, in general
terms, the powers and duties of the state road
commission, leaving specific details to be determined by reasonable rules and regulations which
may be promulgated by the commission."

Regulations imposed upon Mr. Kennedy in the
performance of his "salting" procedure included
the requirement that the warning amber lights,
mounted on the high bumper of the truck be flashing; that the roto-beam amber light be functioning
to warn drivers of other vehicles of the presence of
a potential hazard; that he obey the signal lights
and other traffic signs; that he yield to other traffic
having the right of way.
Having taken all of the foregoing precautions,
the driver is then granted an exception to the "rules
of the road." When necessary in the performance
of his duties, the driver may drive straddling the
lanes of traffic, and if it is necessary to make a wide
turn at an intersection to be in the position of straddling two lanes, this is within the authority of the
State Highway Commission to direct the driver to
operate the equipment in this manner.
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Sufficient testimony was presented to the trial
court, within the full scope of direct, redirect, and
cross examination to justify the conclusion of law
entered by the Lower Court No. 3. That the driver
of defendant's vehicle exercised the degree of care
in negotiating a. left turn as is imposed by law."
Upon direct examination by Mr. Cotro-Manes,
attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant, of Chauncey Eugene
Kennedy, driver of Respondent's State Road Commission Sanding Vehicle, the following testimony
was offered, (R 125):
Q ... Now, when the light turned green
what did you then do Mr. Kennedy?
A I started out into the intersection and
slowly and when it appeared that the traffic going west had halted I noticed one car that had
stopped there and I though that he was going to
let me through so I continued. I went on with
making my turn.

Q What made you think he was going to
let you through?
A

Because he was stopped.

The court also questioned Mr. Kennedy to clarify the observation of traffic made by him prior to
negotiating the left turn: (R 166).
I understood you to say this morning other
cars had come through. Finally, this one you
thought stopping for the light or stopping for
you so you started to turn. l5 that right or
wrong?
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THE \X'ITNESS: Well, that would be right
but I couldn't tell you how many cars.

Mr. Nicholas V. Grip was called as a witness on
behalf of the Plaintiff and testified as follows:
Q . . . Could you describe for us what

you saw?

A Well, I noticed the State vehicle going
east from-let's see. East on Ninth South making
a left turn on State Street.

Q

And what else did you see?

A And I saw a small wagon-a kind of
pickup truck plow right into him.

In answer to Mr. Cotro-Manes question as to
the speed of Respcmdent's truck the same witness
testified:
A Now, that is not easy to say except I
know he was going very slow; going into a turn
and spraying sand so he was going very slow.

Mr. Grip also testified that he did not see the
Appellant's vehicle before the impact (R 107).
The trial court judge was correct in holding that
the driver of Defendant's vehicle exercised the degree of care in negotiating a left turn as is imposed
by law.
CONCLUSION
Appellant has failed to present arguments in its
brief sufficient to show error upon which this court
could grant reversal cf the lower court's decision.
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. The judgment and proceedings in the
lower court are presmptively correct with the
burden upon defendant (appellant) to show
error." Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P.2d
680, 681.

It is respectfully submitted that the judgment
of the court below should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
GARY A. FRANK
Assistant Attorney General
2 3 6 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Respondent

